Are the Armed Forces Understood and Supported by the Public?:A View from the United Kingdom by Hines, Lindsey Anne et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1177/0095327X14559975
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Hines, L. A., Gribble, R., Wessely, S. C., Dandeker, C., & Fear, N. T. (2015). Are the Armed Forces Understood
and Supported by the Public? A View from the United Kingdom. Armed Forces and Society, 41(4), 688-713 .
https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X14559975
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 10. Jul. 2020
Are the Armed Forces Understood and Supported by the Public? A View from the UK 
 
Abstract:  
 
Despite the importance of public opinion in supporting the military and their missions, little is known 
about how the UK public perceive their Armed Forces. This paper reviews and evaluates what is 
currently known about public attitudes towards the UK military and situates the material within the 
framework of the civil-military gap literature. Current evidence suggests that public regard for the UK 
Armed Forces is high despite low levels of support for the Iraq and Afghanistan missions and that 
public understanding of the work of the Armed Forces is limited. Nonetheless, the UK’s long history of 
military deployments may have given the public an ‘intuitive understanding’ of the basic realities of the 
military compared with some other European states. Although there are indications of differences in 
attitudes between the UK Armed Forces and wider British society there is no firm evidence that the civil-
military ‘gap’ has become a ‘gulf’ as claimed by some military leaders.  
 
Keywords:  Public opinion, UK Armed Forces, civil-military gap 
 
 
 
  
Introduction 
 
Introduction 
The United Kingdom (UK) Armed Forces have a well-established tradition of engagement in military 
operations that extends back into Britain’s imperial past. The military has long been a key focus of 
interest for both the UK public and media, but this has strengthened in recent years as a result of their 
involvement in over a decade of intense operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet despite this 
development, how supportive the public are, or how much they understand of the UK Armed Forces 
remains unclear. 
 
How the public perceive their Armed Forces is important for a range of reasons. Public opinion plays an 
important role in supporting defence and foreign policy.1 Public attitudes can also influence recruitment 
and retention in the Armed Forces as well as how Service leavers transition back into civilian society, all 
concerns expressed by the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force (RAF) and the British Army.2 Given these 
issues, it is surprising that there is currently little knowledge on the subject of UK public attitudes 
towards the Armed Forces. While there is some robust research in the US and other European 
countries on these issues, in the UK the majority of studies have been conducted via opinion polls. 
More in-depth or nationally representative data are infrequent in comparison with other nations and it is 
only recently that public attitudes to the military were included in the British Social Attitudes (BSA) 
survey, the most influential survey of public opinion in Britain.3  
 
By drawing on evidence from the BSA survey, as well as a wide-ranging literature review4, we describe 
what is currently known about UK public opinion of the Armed Forces. Key aspects of public support 
have been selected as metrics of  UK public attitudes; public support and pride in the UK Armed 
Forces, voluntary donations to Service charities, support for defence spending, public understanding of 
the Armed Forces. This evidence is blended with understandings about the civil-military gap within the 
UK context in order to build a wider picture of UK public support and understanding for the Armed 
Forces.  
 
The paper begins with an examination of the historical context of the relationship between the UK 
public and the Armed Forces in order to frame our understanding of current public attitudes. We 
proceed to discuss the ‘civil-military gap’ theory and its relevance for an analysis of relations between 
the Armed Forces and society in the UK. Current knowledge on public understanding and support of 
the military will then be presented and summarised.  Finally, gaps in the knowledge base and areas for 
future research are identified.  
 
 
The historical context of UK public support for the Armed Forces  
The relationship between the UK public and the UK Armed Forces has not always been an easy one. 
As an island country based primarily on maritime power, there have only been occasional risks of 
invasion5, with much of the work of the Armed Forces taking place overseas in defence of the British 
Empire.6 The consequent absence of a military presence in everyday society meant that the 
relationship between the public and the Armed Forces was initially fractured, with relatively ambivalent 
public attitudes towards the UK military. Soldiers became better known for the trouble that they caused 
in garrison towns during peacetime than their service, and were frequently viewed as a group to be 
tolerated until they were required.7  
 
This initial disconnection in the relationship between the public and the Armed Forces changed during 
the 20th century. War can often be a time when a nation unites in defence of its shared beliefs and way 
of life, and for the UK public, the First and Second World Wars were no exception.8 Few families were 
left untouched. Experience of direct military service spread throughout society with defence of the 
nation becoming an almost universal experience. Sons, fathers and brothers were called up to active 
military service and women also participated, serving in non-combat roles in the women’s’ branches of 
all three services; the largest, the Woman’s Royal Air Force (WRAF), had 250,000 members between 
1939 and 1945 alone.9 While war weariness affected public morale following the First World War10, 
Nazism in the 1930’s and 1940’s posed a clear moral and physical threat to the UK. Although evidence 
is lacking, it is likely that this helped to rally support for the Armed Forces during a mission that was 
seen, at least in the West, as a just and necessary war. 
 
The end of the Second World War brought about a number of changes to the structure of the Armed 
Forces and the missions in which they were engaged. While defence remained a central focus for the 
government and society during the Cold War and the UK’s contribution to NATO‘s deterrence of the 
Soviet Union, this was accompanied by a variety of small-scale imperial and post-imperial military 
campaigns, including counter-terror operations in Northern Ireland. Conscription ended in the UK in 
196311 at a time when the nature of the missions assigned to the UK Armed Forces began to transform. 
The geo-political changes following the fall of the Berlin wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
meant that engagement in classic inter-state war declined, with the partial exception of the Falklands 
War during the early 1980s (the last case of ‘industrial war’ for the UK until the Gulf war of 1991).12 The 
end of the Cold War shifted the primary focus of the UK Armed Forces from defence of UK territory and 
countering alliances in the Eastern Bloc towards participation in military operations as part of multi-
lateral forces under the auspices of the United Nations or NATO.13 The goals and objectives of these 
“new missions” concentrated on peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, stabilisation and democracy 
building, as well as counter-terror and counter-insurgency operations.14 As these missions became 
increasingly specialised, the need for a large, easily mobilised military declined,  prompting the UK 
Armed Forces to adjust their organisational structure and approach and leading to the emergence of a 
smaller, more agile and highly trained all-volunteer military service which was better suited to 
participation in such missions.15 Economic pressures on public expenditure added a financial rationale 
for reductions in force levels and a rationalisation of the organizational design of the military.16 
 
These changes in the goals and structure of the Armed Forces had implications for public support for 
military operations and the military themselves. Historically, conflicts based on territorial disputes were 
underpinned by a clearly identifiable, ‘existential’ threat or risk from external forces. Such missions often 
have greater legitimacy17 and, as a consequence, higher levels of public support for the Armed 
Forces18 derived from the patriotism invoked during such campaigns. Contemporary missions, on the 
other hand, frequently have aims that are more diffuse, complex or protean – the mission in 
Afghanistan being the most striking example. The resulting public uncertainty about involvement in 
such campaigns is often accompanied by grudging acceptance rather than widespread support.19 With 
public opinion playing an important role in foreign policy, poor support for current military missions can 
also limit the involvement of the UK Armed Forces in future campaigns. For example, it is likely that the 
public’s decreasing support for and perceived lack of success during the Iraq and Afghanistan 
missions20 has contributed to both the public’s and political elite’s reluctance to become involved 
militarily in the crises in Syria and Mali.21 With a formal conclusion to major UK combat operations in 
Afghanistan in April 2014, there is concern amongst political and military leaders that the currently 
strong levels of public support of the Armed Forces might fade into indifference. There are particular 
concerns that once further reductions in the size of the military following the 2015 Security and Defence 
Review are made, the Armed Forces – and especially the British Army, hitherto the largest of the three 
Services – could become increasingly disconnected from, and irrelevant, to the general population. This 
issue of potential disconnections between the Armed Forces and the general public stems from the 
concept of the “civil-military” gap, a theory which helps elucidate differences between the public and 
Armed Forces and the important implications of these on public support of the military, their missions 
and government policy.   
 
The Civil-Military Gap and Attempts to Bridge 
The ‘civil-military gap’ describes the social distance that can arise between the Armed Forces and 
civilians from a lack of contact and shared experiences, and the implications for mutual understanding 
and support.22 In this paper, discussion will focus on the differences in cultures, experiences and 
demographics between the military and civil society in order to explore the impact that the civil-military 
gap may have on public perceptions of the UK Armed Forces. It is important to note that the term can 
also refer to connections between the military and the government: for example, experience of military 
service amongst current UK politicians is low, which may negatively affect the allocation of resources 
towards the military and support for certain defence policies; the last UK defence minister with military 
service left office in 1992.23 However, consideration of this aspect of the gap is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 
The question of the civil-military ‘gap’ arose in the US, firstly in the debate between Huntington and 
Janowitz in the 1960s and 1970s. This addressed how far a military, necessarily conservative in its 
culture due to the functional imperatives of war, could afford to adjust to the increasingly liberal values 
of wider society, or whether society itself should become more conservative in order to bolster the 
military and its capacity to deter and if necessary prevail against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
Scholars in Europe and elsewhere began asking whether their own societies had experienced or were 
likely to experience similar problems, leading to the internationalisation of the ‘civil-military gap’ theory. 
Consensus regarding the answer to this question is still lacking.24   
 
The issue of the civil-military gap is complex, and it is not easy to disentangle and operationalise the 
different facets of diverging cultures, experiences and demographics between the military and civil 
society.25 Although the extent of the gap in the UK is hard to operationalise, there are a number of 
examples that demonstrate the differences between civilian and military norms. The Army has 
expressed concerns that the lack of contact with the military and the social changes associated with the 
shift away from traditional labour-intensive manual occupations26 means that new recruits often do not 
understand the expectations placed upon them.27 Legal and social pressures28 from society have 
forced the Armed Forces to alter a number of practices, overriding military concerns about operational 
effectiveness29; military dismissal for homosexuality was overturned following the intervention of the 
European Court of Human Rights in 200030 and employment opportunities for women have been 
extended, although the debate regarding their formal admission to ground combat roles is on-going.31  
Litigation against the military is increasing, with adverse events during combat operations now much 
more open to legal action from Service personnel, their families or representatives.32 A Supreme Court 
ruling in 2013, confirming that the MOD can be sued for negligence regarding the provision of 
inadequate equipment during missions’ means that human rights legislation can now be applied more 
fully in military spaces and the longstanding norm of combat immunity now being interpreted more 
narrowly.33  
 
The potential disconnections in these areas arising from the ‘gap’ are of particular concern to the 
Armed Forces who rely on public support to maintain morale.34 Disquiet amongst the UK military was 
so high that in 2007, the then Army Chief of General Staff, General (later Lord) Dannatt suggested that 
the traditional civil-military gap had escalated into a ‘gulf’.35 A number of perceived consequences were 
outlined, including a lack of public understanding of the experiences of those who had served and 
indifference to their achievements.36 Dannatt was not alone in holding these views, with both the former 
Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Mike Jackson, and the British commander in Iraq during 2006, 
Major-General Richard Shirreff, expressing dissatisfaction with the current relationship between the 
Armed Forces and the public.37  
 
Concerns about the civil-military gap stem from the broader background of British military history and 
traditions. In countries without conscription, such as the UK, it is generally accepted that contact 
between society and the Armed Forces tends to be lower.38 For example, in the UK only 7% of 17-24 
year olds report they have a member of their family serving in the military.39 Along with the end of 
conscription comes concerns about lower levels of understanding of the military40,  which has spurred 
debate within other European countries such as Austria, Switzerland, France and Sweden about how 
conversion to an all-volunteer force may affect public understanding and appreciation of military life.41 
In the UK, the introduction of an all-volunteer force in the early 1960s occurred at a similar time to the 
beginning of wider cultural changes within the Western world. This shift towards what was subsequently 
referred to as a “post-modern” mind-set, with a greater focus on autonomy and personal fulfilment42 
increasingly separated public attitudes from traditional military values of self-sacrifice, unit cohesion, 
obedience and loyalty to the Crown; attributes the Armed Forces argue are necessary for operational 
effectiveness.43 As most recently demonstrated by the overt public opposition towards the 2001 
Afghanistan conflict and 2003-2009 Iraq campaign44, there has also been an increased questioning of 
tradition and less deference to authority45, with the public progressively more likely to question 
involvement in military campaigns or the evidence provided to support deployment of the UK Armed 
Forces. Combined with a decrease in direct contact between members of the public and military 
personnel, these wider cultural changes and differences in cultural norms and beliefs are likely to have 
contributed to the civil-military gap in the UK. 
 
The strongest indication of the apprehension around the civil-military gap in the UK is the introduction of 
the Armed Forces Covenant.46 The levels of public support and understanding, and in particular how 
this might impact on recruitment, are an issue for all three military services, but for the Army, concerns 
were such that a document on the mutual obligations of the public, the government and the Armed 
Forces was developed as there was a concern that some new recruits had only a vague idea of what 
military life entailed.47 Indeed, the development of the Covenant was tied up with the Army’s defence of 
its professional space from outside incursions and of its interests during the wars of 9/11.48 This formed 
the basis for the Armed Forces Covenant49, which underpins the UK government’s strategy to address 
the civil-military gap. 
 
The introduction of the Armed Forces Covenant into UK legislation in 201150 followed a period of 
extensive public debate regarding the treatment of injured veterans and strong political pressure from 
military and political leaders. The Covenant serves to set out the rights and obligations of the Armed 
Forces, the government and the public in relation to the sacrifices made by those serving in the Armed 
Forces while partially protecting military practices from the interference of society.51 Public support 
appears to be strong, and polls show that in 2011, 62% agreed it was important for the Covenant to be 
enshrined in law in order to protect the welfare of the Armed Force and their families.  
 
As with the Social Compact in the US52, the Covenant seeks to ensure there is provision from the state 
for the Armed Forces and their families, but has stimulated discussion about the support that the 
military currently receive, and perhaps more importantly what they need, in a way that the Social 
Compact never has. Debates around government support for the Armed Forces have been driven by 
media stories about the treatment of military personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan53 and high-
profile campaigns such as the Royal British Legion’s “Honour the Covenant” campaign.54 Much of the 
conversation has focussed on the Government’s duty of care towards individuals who have served their 
country, and this focus is reflected in the view of 68% of the public polled that ‘if the Prime Minister 
makes a promise to the Armed Forces, he should keep it regardless of external circumstances’ (see 
table). It is not clear how successful discussion of the Covenant has been in informing public opinion on 
the relationship and respective obligations between the Armed Forces and the general public.55 Public 
support for the Covenant at the time of its introduction appeared to be strong; polls show that, 62% of 
the public agree it was important for the Covenant to be enshrined in law in order to protect the welfare 
of the Armed Force and their families. A report by the MOD, however, found that 61% of the public 
report knowing nothing about the Covenant (see table), suggesting that it may have not gone far 
enough in meeting the initial aims of emphasising the public obligations towards the Armed Forces and 
that further efforts may be needed. 
 
The Armed Forces Covenant has given rise to other efforts by the UK government to address the civil-
military gap. The Armed Forces Community Covenant, adapted from a US strategy for increasing public 
engagement56, encourages communities to support local military personnel in their area and improve 
public understanding of issues affecting the Armed Forces.57 Veterans Day has been renamed Armed 
Forces Day in order to raise awareness of personnel currently serving as well as those who have been 
involved in previous conflicts. What effect these efforts may have on improving public understanding 
and reducing possible public indifference is difficult to estimate, but exploration of the UK public’s 
support and understanding of the Armed Forces will provide an indication of whether further efforts are 
needed. 
 
UK Public Support for the Armed Forces 
As discussed earlier, public support for the Armed Forces is intimately linked with public support for the 
missions on which they serve. Public endorsement of the contemporary campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan missions peaked during the early stages of invasion and fell significantly as the missions 
continued.58 Since 2006, public support for military operations in Afghanistan has remained at around 
30%-40%59 and although 75% of the public believe removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq was 
the right thing to do, 69% do not believe that the war was worth the human and financial cost.60 Despite 
opposition to the campaigns, the public appear to be overwhelmingly supportive of the military 
personnel serving on them, with more than 90% reporting they support members of the Armed Forces 
regardless of what they think about those missions.61 Clearly, the public are able to separate their 
opinions regarding military operations from attitudes towards military personnel.  
 
Previous data suggest that the public have a positive view of the UK Armed Forces (see table). There is 
a great deal of respect and admiration for the Armed Forces, who are continually reported as a national 
institution or icon that makes members of the public feel proud to be British.62 Supportive attitudes 
towards the Armed Forces vary from 50-80% depending on the survey but are overwhelmingly positive. 
The public is also aware of the professionalism nature of the modern Armed Forces; 83% of the public 
in one survey report a great deal or a fair amount of respect for the Armed Forces because of their work 
in Afghanistan and on other study, 84% admire soldiers as  a profession.63 
  
Findings from the 2011 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey confirm these findings, with 83% of the 
public saying they have a high or a very high opinion of the UK Armed Forces, and 75% reporting a 
great deal of respect.64 This “general” public perception of the UK Armed Forces is likely to vary in 
relation to gender, age, social class, education and political affiliation; generally older people, 
conservatives and men tend to be more supportive of the Armed Forces and their missions.65 Personal 
military experience and family connections to the military are likely to influence attitudes.66 Although 
there are some differences across society, this study found that “most people, irrespective of age, 
educational qualifications or political affiliation – hold the military in high regard” and that these opinions 
are relatively stable over time.67 Thus, the public’s respect and high regard for the Armed Forces, 
suggests an overall positive view of the UK Armed Forces. 
 
That the public are supportive of Armed Forces personnel regardless of opposition to the recent 
missions on which they have served indicates that the Armed Forces are perceived as people doing the 
job they are trained for68 – and doing it well or with professional competence. The separation of the 
politics of a situation from those in it reflects a broader change in western military institutions, stemming 
from the increasing perception of Armed Forces personnel as individuals, defined by their personal and 
familial relationships and professionalism.69 King argues that the emergence of the professional military 
in the 20th century, as epitomised by the all-volunteer force, has changed the social identity of the 
soldier and, therefore, how the public perceives members of the Armed Forces.  Whereas conscripted 
forces drew on identities such as the politically motivated citizen soldier inspired by civic values and/or 
ethnic nationalism, as well as masculine norms, which made up for a lack of military experience, the 
contemporary military relies increasingly on the professionalism of troops to operate effectively. 
Personnel are recruited based on their ability to perform the job and pass objective performance 
standards with sexual orientation, gender, and ethnicity becoming less relevant. As a result, the public 
comes to understand military personnel as individuals in terms of their professional achievement, rather 
as a representation of, for example, national identity.70 
 
Public support includes less overt signs of endorsement. Appreciation for the Armed Forces in the UK is 
commonly expressed through voluntary financial donations to Service charities71 as displayed by the 
overwhelming level of donations to Help for Heroes in the wake of the murder of Lee Rigby.72 Nearly 
two-thirds of the public are aware of a Service charity for ex-Service personnel and more than three-
quarters had donated during the Poppy Appeal prior to the survey.73 The two largest charities, Royal 
British Legion and Help for Heroes, both raised approximately £30 million in their last annual 
campaigns74, and there are an estimated 2,000 Service charities operating in England and Wales 
alone.75 
 
One issue with the success of charitable campaigns is their reliance on characterising Service 
personnel, and veterans in particular, as victims. Although extremely successful in increasing 
donations, this portrayal and its contrast with both military culture and how Service personnel regard 
themselves is a matter for concern. While the MoD appreciates donations to charitable organisations 
and provides information on how to donate to them76, this perception may be contribute to the adoption 
of a sympathetic attitude towards the Armed Forces by the public, especially when fuelled by media 
articles depicting soldiers as not only heroes but as victims of war and government insensitivity.77 This 
hero-victim dichotomy is a catch-22 for the Armed Forces; public sympathy towards the military can 
undermine morale and support for deployment on future missions, but may lead to an increase in 
overall support for the military during operations. Yet, this type of support may be the antithesis of what 
members of the Armed Forces want. As outlined succinctly by former commander of 3 Para Regiment, 
British Army, Colonel Stuart Tootal: "Soldiers don't want sympathy, they don't want pity, they just want 
support, and the last thing they want is for the British public to wobble on them now”.78 
 
Alongside the question of whether the portrayal of members of the Armed Forces by charity 
organisations helps perpetuated public misconceptions about Service veterans, are concerns about 
how much voluntary financial support can be expected of the public during an age of economic 
austerity in the UK. There is likely to be a limit to how much service provision the public feel willing to 
fund outside taxation and how much they feel the government should be responsible for given the 
service of military personnel in their name. The potential for public indifference to increase following the 
conclusion of major operations in Afghanistan and a reduction in the amount of news coverage of the 
military may affect public donations to charities, either through a decrease in public awareness of 
issues facing military personnel or a decline in willingness to donate to such charities. 
  
Another measure of support for the Armed Forces, albeit one with a less immediate link to personnel, is 
public endorsement of government defence spending. Relative to other spending priorities, in particular 
health and education, there is limited support for increased defence expenditure despite high support 
for military personnel during the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. Even following public debates and 
news stories regarding a lack of resources for deployed personnel during the Afghanistan mission, 
public endorsement of defence spending did not change significantly, although it might be expected if it 
ensured personnel had what the public viewed as the appropriate level resources.79 However, support 
for such measures may be meaningless when they occur in direct competition with other public sectors 
that are seen as more deserving. There also appears to be some tension in public attitudes regarding 
defence spending. When the public are asked about increasing defence spending in relation to 
budgetary cuts in other areas or following information on current levels of expenditure, there is little 
support for an increase. However, when asked in relation to the ability of the UK to defend itself, 
defence receives greater support (see table). With the current period of economic austerity likely to 
persist for the next decade, how this tension may play out politically, especially in comparison with 
protected areas such as health, as well as following UK withdrawal from Afghanistan, is a matter of 
interest.   
 
Overall, the public appears to hold the UK Armed Forces in high regard, but opposition to recent 
missions might mean that public endorsement continues to come with an a more ambivalent element of 
sympathy or pity, although we cannot be certain of the extent of this. As a result of this, the stability of 
UK public support for the Armed Forces is far from certain. It is unknown whether this current situation, 
and the currently high levels of public support, will continue once the military withdraws from 
Afghanistan.  
 
Understanding of the Armed Forces amongst the UK public 
On the surface it appears that public understanding of the Armed Forces may be low, possibly an 
indication of a level of indifference. Opinion poll data suggest that the majority of the public do not feel 
confident in their understanding of the Armed Forces (see table). When asked about their knowledge of 
the Armed Forces, 41% of the public report knowing only a little or almost nothing about the military, 
and 62% report knowing not very much or very little about the daily military life.80 Understanding of the 
work of the Armed Forces is also low. Many of the public believe their comprehension of the objectives 
of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions to be incomplete81 and accurate estimation of the number of 
deaths during these operations is poor.82 Taken together, these findings imply, at the very least, lack of 
attention to the information available on the work of the military and at the most, an absence of interest 
in what the military do. While it is difficult to pinpoint the reasons for this, it is possible that public 
indifference to the military may be arising from a decrease in contact83, although public fatigue and 
confusion over the political complexities of recent missions should be considered as well. However, it is 
important to differentiate between understanding of the role of the military and understanding of recent 
missions. Doing so requires further in-depth analysis of public opinion.  
 
In this regard, and given the lack of empirical evidence on public understanding of the UK Armed 
Forces, we can draw on the UK’s imperial and post-imperial history to further investigate public 
understanding. The UK public is well accustomed to a military that is regularly deployed on 
expeditionary operations84 – there has been only one year since 1945 when the Armed Forces were not 
on active duty or suffered an operational casualty.85 The long-standing tradition of commemorating past 
conflicts in the UK86, which continued during the recent Iraq and Afghanistan missions, along with the 
media coverage and parliamentary statements of fatalities and high-profile repatriation of casualties in 
Royal Wootton Bassett (now discontinued), are likely to have reinforced the sense of sacrifice inherent 
in military service in the collective mind of the UK public. These previous campaigns and practices may 
have allowed the public to develop what we term an “intuitive” rather than a direct, experientially based 
understanding based on common assumptions about the military.  
 
This intuitive understanding or awareness is unlikely to apply to all European states or in the same way, 
and comparison with other European states adds support to the idea of an intuitive understanding 
amongst the UK public. Nations with an imperial past similar to the UK, such as France, find it taking 
part in missions in order to retain part of their historical power more acceptable.87 For the populations of 
countries without such histories, and where combat is less likely to be a major role of their military 
forces, understanding of the Armed Forces is likely to differ. For example, in Sweden, the public 
perceive their nation as peaceful and neutral, and as a result support for the military declines whenever 
they are deployed on non-humanitarian missions.88 Similarly, Germany’s avoidance of combat roles as 
a result of their involvement in the Second World War89, has led to hesitation to refer to their 
participation in operations in Afghanistan as a “war” 90 and reluctance among both the public91 and the 
government92 to involve German military personnel in Libya in 2011. In the UK, the public may not 
agree with recent operations as seen during protests prior to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. With 
evidence for strong public support for the Armed Forces despite this, as discussed earlier, this suggests 
a general understanding and acceptance of the combat role of the military among the UK public.  
 
Reflecting on the matter of intuitive understanding, both in a UK and European context, allows us to 
consider some of the broader implications for civil-military relations. For this we can turn to King’s 
recent discussion on the memorialising of casualties. The ways in which military deaths are presented 
to the public will contribute to their understanding, and King argues that in commemorating the deaths 
of their comrades in repatriation parades and remembrance services, military personnel stress the 
professionalism of those who have lost their lives and the personal significance of their deaths for their 
unit or regiment as well as grieving family members. This brings the focus on personnel to their 
individual role, and is in contrast with earlier in the 20th century, when such losses were contextualised 
in terms of the wider causes of Nation and patriotism. King is careful to note national variations here: 
‘Canada is very close to Britain and at the local level similar processes are observable in the US. In 
France and Germany the concept of the nation and the political context of the deaths are stressed 
much more’.93 The idea that military personnel increasingly self-identify in terms of professionalism 
finds an echo in the perceptions of wider society. The British public not only support the troops rather 
than the war [in both Iraq and Afghanistan] but do so in ways that focus on the individuals and their 
families who have lost their lives or been injured in the wars. Consequently, the narrative presented is 
of Armed Forces personnel fulfilling a professional role, an understanding of which has developed 
among the public.  
 
Given the lack of contact between the Armed Forces and the public, it seems likely that their 
understanding of their Armed Forces may have become intuitively drawn from the conceptions of the 
military role that have formed during previous conflicts, reinforced by the widespread presence of war 
memorials and processes of memorialising such as Poppy Day, as well as recent commemorations of a 
distinctly personal and familial kind epitomised in the repatriation of those killed in action via Royal 
Wootton Basset. This may not provide a strong understanding of military life or the Armed Forces, but 
can become a spur for political action. For example, the public have been drawing attention to the 
support systems mitigating family and personal losses arising from war. Military family policy, and duty 
of care issues have become politicised, and as previously discussed earlier in terms of the Armed 
Forces Covenant, the government is encouraged to commit to allocating scarce resources to these 
matters. There is now a legal precedent to do so; three key principles established by the Supreme 
Court ruling in June 2013 were that the MOD could be sued for negligence, Human Rights legislation 
was applicable within military and operational areas and the interpretation of the idea of combat 
immunity was narrowed. 94 Unsurprisingly, there are concerns in military and MOD circles that the ruling 
will lead to a flood of litigation and have deleterious effect on training and equipment.95 This 
increasingly legal and social context of contestation amongst Service personnel, their families, the 
wider public and the MOD may provide a framework in which public understanding and support of the 
Armed Forces, whether on operations or not, will evolve. 
  
 
Conclusion 
Our analysis suggests that the UK public have high regard for the UK Armed Forces but little support 
for the recent missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The public also make a clear distinction between the 
politics of the mission and the individuals serving on it. Public understanding of the work of the Armed 
Forces and their recent missions is poor, possibly due to a lack of interest or fatigue regarding 
coverage of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions. Despite this the UK’s long history of military 
deployments may have instilled the public with an intuitive understanding of the basic realities of 
military life compared to other European states. This form of understanding highlights a distinctive 
feature of UK civil-military relations, which appears to reflect a broader western social transformation.  
 
A major military and political concern has been whether the civil-military gap might have widened into a 
gulf. While we see evidence of some divergences in attitudes between civil and military cultures we 
found no suggestion that a difference of this magnitude exists within the UK, but as the operational 
profile of the UK Armed Forces reduces following the withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 
current support and interest amongst the public might wane into indifference. Further public reflection 
about the heritage of the wars of 9/11, especially the costs relative to what has been achieved, might 
lead them to focus some of their doubts about the mission on to the military institution itself and the 
personnel that comprise it. In addition, as in previous eras, the different parts of the public are likely to 
think of Service and ex-Service personnel in terms of a shifting kaleidoscope of images: the hero, the 
victim and the villain. Such myths, including the idea that most Service personnel are damaged by their 
service, provide the context in which military and political concerns in the UK about the civil-military gap 
becoming a gulf are likely to re-surface. 
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